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Abstract—  The  separation  of  ownership  and  control  that  is  a 
typical feature of listed companies  gives rise to agency problems. 
This problem is acutely reflected in the conflicting interests of 
stockholders   and  directors.  An  area  in  which  this  problem  is 
played out relates to doctrinal approaches towards corporate 
opportunities,  which  has  attracted  a  debate  involving  a 
comparison of the approach of English law and most states in the 
United  States.  This  paper  seeks  to  contribute   to  the  current 
debate  on corporate  opportunities  by comparing  the Australian 
and    Delaware    approaches    to    corporate    opportunities    by 
directors. In particular, it explores self-dealing  by a director who 
pursues corporate opportunities potentially at the expense of his 
corporation.  This type of self-dealing is worth examining because 
of its potential effect of depriving the corporation of profits or 
opportunities  which  may  be essential  to its operation,  harming 
the corporation, or putting the director in competition with the 
corporation of which he is meant to be a fiduciary.
Keywords- corporate opportunity; directors; self-dealing 
transactions; fiduciary duty
I. INTRODUCTION
The  separation  of  ownership  and  control  that  is  a  typical 
feature of listed companies gives rise to agency problems [1]. 
This problem is acutely reflected in the conflicting interests of 
stockholders   and  directors   [2].  Agency  theory  posits  that 
directors  have  a strong  temptation  to  act  in  their  own  self- 
interest at the expense of stockholders [3]. Easterbrook and 
Fischel describe this as involving “(d)uty-of-loyalty problems 
(that)  often  involve  spectacular,  one-shot  appropriations,  of 
the  “  take  the  money  and  run”    sort,  in  which  subsequent 
penalties through markets are inadequate” [4]. Traditional 
corporate  legal  thought  seeks  to  address  this  problem  by 
arguing   for   strong   legal   rules   to   discourage   insiders   or 
directors from undertaking  courses of action that favour their 
own utility over those of stockholders [2] [3]. 
An area in which this problem is played out relates to doctrinal 
approaches  towards  corporate  opportunities,  which  has 
attracted a debate involving a comparison  of the approach of 
English  law  and  most  states  in  the  United  States  [5].  This 
paper seeks to contribute to the current debate on corporate 
opportunities by comparing the Australian and Delaware 
approaches to corporate opportunities by directors. Delaware’s 
preeminence in corporate law makes it an ideal benchmark for 
a comparison with Australian corporate opportunities law [6]. 
II. SELF-DEALING TRANSACTIONS AND CORPORATE
OPPORTUNITIES 
There  are at least two types  of self-dealing  transactions:  (1) 
those in which controllers (e.g. directors, influential managers 
and controlling shareholders, including their close relatives or 
companies owned by their close relatives) deal with the 
corporation; and (2) those where controllers may exploit 
opportunities  that  potentially  belong  to  the  corporation  [7]. 
The first type of transaction represents traditional self-dealing
where the terms of the transaction,  typically  not being based 
on arm’s length negotiations, tend to be unfavourable to the 
corporation [7]. Self-dealing of the first type might involve 
purchases   or  sales  of  corporate   assets  by  controllers   and 
corporate  guarantees  in favour of controllers  [7]. The second 
type of self-dealing, which is the focus of this paper, involves 
“corporate opportunity” transactions where a controller 
expropriates   business   opportunities   that   could   have   been 
pursued or exploited by his corporation.1
In this paper, we explore the second type of self-dealing which 
involves  a  director  pursuing  corporate  opportunities 
potentially  at  the  expense  of  his  corporation.2  This  type  of
1 A well known example involves the acquisition of Pepsi-Cola 
by  an  executive  of another  beverage  company.  See  Guth v
Loft, Inc., 5 Atlantic Reporter, Second Series (A.2d) 503 
(Delaware Supreme Court 1939). 
2  It   is   important   to   acknowledge    that   a   very   restrictive 
approach   to  the  pursuit   of  corporate   opportunities   by  a 
director may curtail entrepreneurial activity or be 
disadvantageous   to  a  company   since   their   pursuit   by  a 
director can benefit it as well. See David Kershaw “Lost in 
Translation:     Corporate     Opportunities     in     Comparative 
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self-dealing is worth examining because of its potential effect 
of depriving the corporation  of profits or opportunities  which 
may be essential to its operation,  harming the corporation, or 
putting  the  director  in  competition  with  the  corporation  of 
which he is meant to be a fiduciary [8]. 
III. DIRECTOR’S FIDUCIARY DUTY
As  we  will  shortly  see,  the  doctrine  on  “corporate
opportunity”   transactions   evolved   from   a   basic   rule   of 
corporate law that states that a director has a fiduciary duty of 
loyalty to his corporation.3  This duty is generally accepted [9]
[10] [11].  Given  the  importance  of  the  fiduciary  duty  of
loyalty, we will first provide a brief overview of this duty by
tracing its genesis from past commentaries  and jurisprudence,
before discussing the doctrine on corporate opportunity
transactions. 4  This  historical  approach  is  crucial  in
understanding the emergence of the corporate opportunity
transactions doctrine.
A director’s fiduciary duty of loyalty rests on his corollary and 
fundamental duty to promote the objects and purposes of the 
corporation  and manage it in the interests of the shareholders 
as a whole [2] [12]. From these important duties emanate the 
rule that a director must exercise care and reasonable prudence 
in the conduct  of his duties  [13] and not to pursue  his own 
interest in a way that harms the corporation  [14]. A director 
must also reasonably protect and conserve the interests of his 
corporation  [15] [16] [17]. His failure to comply with any of 
these duties will cause him to incur a legal liability towards his 
corporation  [14].  A  director’s  duty  towards  his  corporation 
was classically stated in Guft v. Loft, Inc. [18] as follows: 
A  public  policy,  existing   through   the  years,  and 
derived from a profound knowledge of human 
characteristics  and  motives,  has  established  a  rule 
that demands of a corporate officer or director, 
peremptorily and inexorably, the most scrupulous 
observance  of  his  duty,  not  only  affirmatively   to 
protect the interests of the corporation  committed  to 
his charge,  but also  to refrain  from  doing  anything 
that  would  work  injury  to  the  corporation,   or  to 
deprive it of profit or advantage which his skill and 
ability  might  properly  bring  to it, or to enable  it to 
make in the reasonable and lawful exercise of its 
powers. The rule that requires an undivided and 
unselfish  loyalty  to  the  corporation   demands  that 
Perspective”  (2005)  25(4)  Oxford  Journal  of Legal  Studies 
603. 
3 See   [14]   where   the   corporate   opportunity   doctrine   was 
described  as “one  of the  refinements  of this  basic  rule”  on 
“the fiduciary duty of loyalty which a director or officer owes 
to  his  corporation.”   For  D’Agostini   and  Gilbert   [8],  the 
doctrine  of “‘corporate  opportunity’  is one phase of the rule 
of undivided loyalty on the part of corporate fiduciaries.” 
4 In this paper, we will be using the pronouns “he” and “him” 
to refer to a director. This use is for simplicity and in no way 
indicates that only males are or can be directors. 
there  shall  be  no  conflict  between  duty  and  self- 
interest. 
The director’s fiduciary duty of loyalty is usually formulated 
either as being comparable to that of an agent [19] [20] or a 
trustee [14]. Some scholars, however, question the 
characterisation of a director’s fiduciary duty as similar to that 
of an agent [19]. For one, although a director can occasionally 
be a corporate agent, such a duty does not actually accord with 
the  basic  principles  of  agency  [19].  For  instance,  while  a 
director  may  generally  delegate  some  of  his  functions  to 
corporate officers, an agent is generally prohibited from 
delegating his authority to another under the principle of 
delegatus non potest delegare [21]. As well, an agent derives 
his authority from his principal who may revoke it [22] [23].5
But  the  authority   of  a  director   is  not  derived   from   the 
corporation itself and is not usually subject to revocation [20]. 
Finally, an agent can typically be controlled by his principal 
directly,   whereas   a  director   is  free  from   control   by  his 
corporation [24]. An old New York decision explained the 
problem with the director-agency analogy as follows [25]: 
The board of directors of a corporation does not stand 
in the same relation to the corporate body which a 
private agent holds towards his principal. In the strict 
relation of principal and agent, all the authority of the 
latter is derived by delegation from the former, and if 
the power of substitution is not conferred in the 
appointment, it cannot exist at all. But in corporate 
bodies the powers of the board of directors are, in a 
very important sense, original and undelegated. 
A more common way of describing the fiduciary duty of a 
director is as that of a trustee [3] [14] [18] [26] [27]. As Berle 
and Means remarked, “we begin and end with the assumption 
that the directors  are trustees  by virtue of business  ethics as 
well  as  law,  and  that  the  powers  which  they  exercise  are 
powers  in trust” [3]. The cases of Lagarde  and Guth, which 
are  examined  in  detail  later,  also  employ  the  same 
characterisation  of the director as a trustee of the corporation. 
But the director-trustee comparison has also drawn criticism. 
Uhlman explained his discontent with the analogy as follows: 
“there is little resemblance between the status of a director and 
that of a trustee under a trust agreement; and an impressive 
argument against such identification may be rested on the fact 
that a trustee is the legal owner of the trust res, while title to 
the corporate property is not vested in the directors, but in the 
corporate entity [20]. 
Uhlman observed that the tendency of courts and writers has 
5 An agency  may of course be irrevocable  if coupled  with an 
interest:  see  Warren  A  Seavey  “The  Rationale  of  Agency” 
(1920)   29(8)  The  Yale  Law  Journal   859;  Benedikt   M  J 
Luthge “Law of Agency in Comparison:  A Look at the Civil 
Law Jurisdictions of the State of Louisiana and the Federal 
Republic of Germany” (2012) 21 Cardozo Journal of
International & Comparative Law 697. 
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been to avoid characterising the fiduciary duty of a director as 
that of an agent or trustee, and instead to simply state that they 
act as fiduciaries [20]. For instance, the court in Kavanaugh v.
Kavanaugh  Knitting  Co.  [28]  described  directors’  fiduciary 
duties more broadly: 
The directors are bound by all those rules of 
conscientious  fairness,  morality  and  honesty  in 
purpose,  which  the  law  imposes  as  the  guides  for 
those who are under the fiduciary obligations and 
responsibilities.  They  are held,  in official  action,  to 
the  extreme  measure  of  candor,  unselfishness  and 
good faith. These principles are rigid, essential and 
salutary. 
Fuller expressed the view that the status of a corporate director 
is sui generis. He said that the director “is neither an agent nor 
a trustee, although in many instances the same considerations 
which have dictated judicial condemnation of the conduct of 
agents and trustees apply with equal force to directors”  [12]. 
But, director-agent or director-trustee  analogy aside, there is a 
strong  agreement   about  directors  having  a  fiduciary  duty 
towards their corporations [19]. 
In sum, a director’s fiduciary duty arises from his relationship 
of trust and confidence with the corporation, and brings with it 
an expectation that he exercise good faith and honesty in his 
actions [20]. Berle and Means formulated the three main rules 
of  conduct  relating  to  a director’s  fiduciary  duty  as:  “(1)  a 
decent  amount  of  attention  to  business;  (2)  fidelity  to  the 
interests of the corporation; (3) at least reasonable business 
prudence”  [3]  [20].  Such  duties  may  further  be  reduced  to 
three: 1) faithfulness, 2) loyalty, and 3) diligence [3] [20]. 
IV. DOCTRINE ON CORPORATE OPPORTUNITY
TRANSACTIONS 
The  doctrine  on  “corporate  opportunity”  transactions  as  it 
stands today “was pretty much nonexistent” and “had yet to be 
defined” during the nineteenth-century [29]. The early 
formulation   of  the  doctrine  was  couched  in  terms  of  the 
fiduciary duty of loyalty of a director or officer not to pursue 
his own interest in a way that harms the corporation [14]. The 
law as it existed then, which allowed corporations to only have 
a limited purpose and directors to pursue only a corporation’s 
limited and chartered purpose – as embodied in the ultra vires
principle – meant that directors were barred from undertaking 
acts that were  outside  their corporation’s  chartered  purposes 
[29] [30] [31]. Consequently  it was problematic  for past case
law to expand on the “corporate opportunity doctrine”
considering that corporate law could not contemplate the
operation   of   a  corporation   beyond   its   specific   chartered
purpose [32].
This previous state of the law did not mean that corporate 
opportunities   as  understood  today  did  not  exist  then.  For 
instance, Savitt observed that it was common for officers and 
directors  of the New England  banking  industry  in the 
nineteenth-century to exploit attractive business opportunities 
that  were  potentially  suitable  for  the  companies  that  they 
served [27]. In fact, self-dealing  was expected as an ordinary 
and routine part of doing business at that time [27]. Early 
nineteenth-century  banks were often viewed as “mere engines 
to supply (their) directors with money” that tended to lend a 
large part of their assets to insiders [24]. It was thus common 
for a bank’s directors to borrow large sums of money from the 
bank on very favorable terms, which they would then invest in 
companies   for   their   own   benefit   [28].   Even   when   such 
directors generated profits from their side activities that were 
closely linked to and aided by their companies’ principal 
business, their shareholders still had no legal claim to those 
profits [28]. 
V. INTEREST OF EXPECTANCY TEST
An early attempt to address corporate opportunity was made in 
1900  in Lagarde v Anniston Lime & Stone Co. [34] [35]. In 
that case the corporation Anniston had purchased a one-third 
interest  in  a  land  that  contained  a  valuable  quarry.  It  then 
made a contractual commitment to lease and purchase another 
one-third interest in the land and was in negotiations for some 
time  to buy the remaining  one-third  interest  in it. However, 
John   and   Louis   Lagarde,   after   becoming   directors   and 
majority  stockholders  of  Anniston,  acquired  for  themselves 
the remaining two-thirds of the land. The Alabama court, in 
formulating the “interest or expectancy” test of corporate 
opportunities  ruled  that  Anniston  acquired  rights  to  a 
constructive trust over the one-third in which it had made a 
contractual  commitment  to lease and purchase  [36] [37]. The 
court, however, found no breach of fiduciary duty over the 
remaining one-third of the land for which the corporation was 
in negotiations, and said [34]: 
(T)he legal restrictions which rest upon such officers
in their acquisitions are generally limited to property
wherein   the   corporation   has   an   interest   already
existing or in which it has an expectancy growing out
of an existing right, or to cases where the officers’
interference will in some degree balk the corporation
in effecting the purposes of its creation.
Hence, if none of these circumstances  existed, i.e. the 
corporation: 1) had an existing interest, 2) had an expectancy 
growing out of an existing right, or 3) would be balked in 
effecting the purposes of its creation by the interference of its 
directors, no fiduciary duty would attach and be breached by 
such officers. As stated by the Alabama court in Lagarde [34]: 
Good faith to the corporation does not require of its 
officers that they steer from their own to the 
corporation’s  benefit  enterprises  or  investments 
which,  though  capable  of  profit  to  the  corporation, 
have in no way become subject to their trust or duty. 
For the Alabama court, the question of whether the directors 
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learned  of  the  opportunity   in  their  personal   or  corporate 
capacities would not even be relevant [38]. Under the Lagarde
“interest   or   expectancy”   test   of   corporate   opportunities, 
projects  over  which  the  corporation  could  lay  claim  to  an 
existing contractual right were part of its “interest” [29]. 
Furthermore, a corporation was deemed to have an expectancy 
even in projects which it had not yet secured by an express 
contract, for as long as its current rights were likely to mature 
later into a contractual right [39]. A limitation of the “interest 
or expectancy” test was that a corporate opportunity was 
ultimately narrowly defined on the basis of a corporation’s 
current or pre-existing activities, and did not account for a 
corporation’s prospective or future activities [40]. 
It  is  important  to  note  that  although  the  Alabama  court  in 
Lagarde might have touched upon corporate opportunities in 
formulating the “interest or expectancy” test, it did not 
specifically  develop  a  “distinct  corporate  opportunity 
doctrine” [14]. Rather the pursuit by the Anniston directors of 
opportunities  that  were  very  closely  related  to  the 
corporation’s own activities and purposes was deemed to be 
sufficiently disruptive as to cause injury to the corporation and 
to lead to the creation of a constructive trust [14]. This limited 
legal  formulation   left  it  open  for  corporate  executives   to 
validly pursue their own personal interests even in those 
situations  where  their corporations  could  have profited  from 
the same opportunities for as long as their actions did not meet 
the threshold requirement  of the “interest or expectancy”  test 
[14]. Some have suggested that the severe consequences of the 
constructive-trust remedy might have prompted the Alabama 
court from expanding the principle [14]. Where a constructive 
trust   was   deemed   imposed,   a   corporation   was   typically 
permitted to recover all profits earned by a corporate officer, 
on top of damages for any injury sustained, even though the 
profits might be fully attributable  to his skills and initiative, 
and any risk of loss was borne solely by him [14]. 
Notwithstanding the Lagarde decision in 1900, the corporate 
opportunity issue only drew scholarly attention in 1920 when 
Kenneth  Riley  published  an  article  in  the  Minnesota  Law 
Review on the right of corporations to the profits made by 
directors,  based  on  a  survey  of  the  case  law  [29].  Riley, 
however, framed the obligation of directors in relation to the 
corporate opportunity issue in terms of their broader duty of 
loyalty   as  trustees   of  the  corporation   who  could  not  be 
permitted to acquire interests adverse to their cestuis [9]. 
Canvassing,  for instance, the Illinois case of Farwell v. Pyle-
National  Electric  Headlight  Co.  [41],  Riley  noted  that  the 
court  therein  declined  to allow  the directors  from  collecting 
any royalty from the corporation for royalty rights over certain 
patented  items  they  had  purchased  for  their  own  benefit, 
where the corporation itself was financially positioned to take 
advantage of them [9]. In that case, the court ruled that the 
directors were deemed to have purchased the royalty rights in 
trust for the corporation [41]. Prior to the directors’ act of 
purchasing the royalty rights, the court observed that the 
corporation   had   already   secured   a   license   from   certain 
individuals to manufacture and sell certain patented items and 
was obliged to pay royalties for the license. 
The legal constraint,  enunciated  in Lagarde v. Anniston Lime 
&  Stone   Co.   [34]  and   Farwell   v  Pyle-National   Electric
Headlight Co. [41], that debarred a director from entering a 
transaction   that  could  tempt  him  to  exploit  his  corporate 
position for his own interest and injure his corporation as a 
consequence was based on an equitable principle of a duty of 
loyalty   that   the   director   owed   the   corporation   [9].   As 
previously  stated,  under  that  principle,  a  corporation  had  a 
legal remedy against the fiduciary (director) if the latter had a 
personal interest in the transaction that was adverse to that of 
the best interests of the corporation and prejudiced its interests 
in advancing his own personal interest [9]. Otherwise, the 
fiduciary (director) was not constrained from exploiting the 
opportunity for its own benefit [9]. 
VI. THE LINE OF BUSINESS TEST
The corporate  opportunity  doctrine  saw further  development 
in Guth v. Loft Inc. [18] that touched  upon the early days of 
global  giant Pepsi-Cola.   In that case Guth, the President  of 
Loft,  Inc.,  another  beverage  company,  had  acquired  Pepsi- 
Cola  using  Loft’s  funds  and  practically  tied  up  the  entire 
working capital of Loft in his personal affairs [42] [43]. Guth 
also used Loft’s funds for cash advances to himself and to pay 
salaries  to Loft  employees  who  worked  full time  for Pepsi- 
Cola [42]. When Guth eventually resigned as President of Loft 
to work full-time for Pepsi-Cola, he had by then acquired 
ownership over 91% of Pepsi-Cola’s stock [43] [44]. 
Loft   subsequently   filed   suit   in   the   Delaware   Court   of 
Chancery against Guft to recover ownership of his shares in 
Pepsi-Cola.    Loft based its claim of ownership over Guft’s 
shareholding in Pepsi-Cola on Guth’s acquisition of the Pepsi- 
Cola opportunity by virtue of his office in Loft and his use of 
Loft’s funds and facilities to build Pepsi-Cola [42] [45]. In 
particular, Loft argued that the use of its 200 soda fountains, 
capital   resources   and  managerial   and  sales  force  for  the 
operations of Pepsi-Cola greatly contributed to the success of 
Pepsi-Cola [42] [45]. Guth’s limited personal funds was even 
more telling, argued Loft, since this showed that he was not in 
a position to make a strong financial investment in Pepsi-Cola. 
Hence, in law Guth pursued a corporate opportunity for the 
benefit of Loft and not for himself, contended Loft further [42] 
[45]. 
Notably Loft’s corporate opportunity claim against Guft was 
framed according to a general duty of loyalty by directors as 
established in case law [29] and as enunciated in Lagarde v.
Anniston Lime & Stone Co [34]. As previously  explained, the 
court  in  Lagarde  had  said  that  a  director’s  fiduciary  duty 
would attach when a corporate opportunity  was one in which 
the corporation either had an existing interest in it or had an 
expectancy growing out of an existing right. 
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The Delaware Chancellor, after reviewing the evidence, found 
in favour of Loft and ruled that Loft was the equitable owner 
of Pepsi-Cola [42]. He also found a conclusive demonstration 
“that it was Loft with its resources that did in fact supply all 
the bone, sinew and vital force which made Pepsi what it now 
is” [42]. Hence the offer, he said, could not “be viewed in any 
light   other   than   an   expectancy   that   was   Loft’s”,   which 
estopped   him  from  denying   that  the  opportunity   actually 
belonged to Loft [42]. 
It  was  the  ruling  by  the  Delaware  Supreme  Court,  on  an 
appeal by Guth, which signalled an expansion of the corporate 
opportunities   doctrine.   As   noted,   prior   case   law   on   the 
corporate opportunity  doctrine focused on either the “interest 
or expectancy” test or the fiduciary duty of directors. Based on 
case law at that time, an officer or director was free to treat a 
corporate opportunity as his own if it was one that was not 
essential to the corporation or in which the corporation had no 
interest or expectancy [18]. As observed by the Delaware 
Supreme   Court,   the   Delaware   Chancellor   had   based   his 
decision on the creation of a “constructive  trust” which arose 
from  the  general  duty  of  loyalty  that  Guth,  as  a  fiduciary, 
owed to Loft as its controlling director and President [18]. In 
sum,   the   Delaware   Supreme   Court   pointed   out   that   the 
corporate opportunity doctrine was “merely one of the 
manifestations  of the general rule that demands  of an officer 
or  director   the  utmost   good   faith  in  his  relation   to  the 
corporation  which he represents”  [18].. The Court also drew
attention to the inseparable connection between “(d)uty and 
loyalty” of an officer or director [18]. 6 
Signalling  a  broadening  of  the  corporate  opportunities 
doctrine,  the  Delaware  Supreme  Court  stated  that  the  true 
issue was whether the Pepsi-Cola opportunity was “so closely 
associated with the existing business activities of Loft, and so 
essential thereto, as to bring the transaction within that class of 
cases where the acquisition of the property would throw the 
corporate officer purchasing it into competition with his 
company” [18]. 
The above formulation represented a marked departure from 
earlier case law such as Lagarde that had applied the “interest 
or expectancy” test, under which no duty of loyalty attached 
where  there  was  no  violation  of  a  pre-existing   corporate 
interest  [29]  [32].  The  Delaware   Supreme   Court  rejected 
Guth’s argument that Loft had no interest or expectancy in the 
Pepsi-Cola opportunity – which was “not in the line of Loft’s 
activities”  as a retail  candy  business  [18]. Guth  himself  had 
admitted, the Court observed, that the phrase “in the line of a 
business” was “so elastic as to furnish no basis for a useful 
inference” [18]. 
6 In  Guth  v  Loft,  Inc.,  5  Atlantic  Reporter,   Second  Series 
(A.2d)  503  (Delaware   Supreme   Court  1939)  at  510,  the 
Delaware   Supreme  Court  defined  duty  as  “that  which  is 
required by one’s station or occupation; is that which one is 
bound  by  legal  or  moral  obligation  to  do  or  refrain  from 
doing.” 
The  Court  also  pointed  out  that  although  an  “opportunity” 
must be “reasonably within the scope of a corporation’s 
activities,”  the  definition  also  had  to  account  for  a 
corporation’s development and expansion [18]. A restrictive 
definition would otherwise “deny the history of industrial 
development,”  said  the Court  [18].  Hence,  the link  between 
Loft and Pepsi-Cola  was “close”  because  Pepsi-Cola  was in 
the  business  of  manufacturing  cola  syrup  and  the 
manufacturing of cola syrups was important to Loft’s soda 
fountain business [18]. 
VII. “ESSENTIAL TO THE BUSINESS” TEST
A third test regarding the corporate opportunities doctrine 
emerged   in   News-Journal   Corporation   v.  Gore  [46]  and 
Blaustein v. Pan American Petroleum & Transport Co. [47] In 
the  first  case,  Davidson,  a  majority  shareholder  of  News- 
Journal Corporation bought two parcels of land. The first was 
a  vacant  lot  that  adjoined  in  the  rear  the  lot  on  which  the 
building occupied by the corporation was situated. The vacant 
lot  had  been  used  for  the  ingress  and  egress  to  the  back 
entrance of the corporation’s building, without the permission 
of the vacant lot’s owner. The second parcel of land purchased 
by Davidson five years later was one on which the corporation 
had  located  its  entire  equipment   and  offices  based  on  a 
contract of lease with a lessor over a land that had a mortgage. 
Notably News-Journal Corporation had neither an existing 
interest nor an expectancy growing out of an existing right in 
either of the two parcels of land. Hence the “interest or 
expectancy”  test  articulated  in  Lagarde  v. Anniston  Lime &
Stone Co. [34] could not be met. The purchase of the parcels 
of land could also not be said to meet the Guth v. Loft Inc. [18] 
“line of business  test” since its purchase  was not an activity 
that was in line with the publishing business of News-Journal 
Corporation. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court of Florida, 
articulating the “essential to the business” test, ruled in favour 
of the corporation. 
Arguably, the “essential to the business” test was partly raised 
in Guth v. Loft, Inc. [18]  The  Delaware  Supreme  Court  had 
stated therein that the issue was whether the Pepsi-Cola 
opportunity   was  “so  closely   associated   with  the  existing 
business activities of Loft, and so essential thereto, as to bring 
the transaction within that class of cases where the acquisition 
of the property would throw the corporate officer purchasing it 
into  competition  with  his  company”  [18].  However,  I 
demarcate the “essential to the business” test to emphasise that 
it can be a separate test, as also shown in Blaustein v. Pan
American Petroleum & Transport Co. below [47]. 
In  Blaustein  v.  Pan  American  Petroleum  &  Transport  Co.
[47], the court while adopting the “interest or expectancy” test 
also  added  a  separate  test  of  whether  the  opportunity   in 
relation to the corporation is “essential to its existence.” The 
Supreme Court of New York (Appellate Division) said in that 
case, “One who occupies a fiduciary relation to a corporation 
may not acquire, in opposition to the corporation,  property in 
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which the corporation has an interest or tangible expectancy or 
which is essential to its existence” [47]. 
VIII. THE “FAIRNESS” TEST
The first three tests discussed above can be described as tests 
that  look  at  the  nature  of  the  corporate  opportunity.   The 
“interest   or   expectancy”   test   seeks   to   determine   if   the 
corporate  opportunity  was one in which “the corporation  has 
an interest already existing or in which it has an expectancy 
growing out of an existing right” [34]. The “line of business” 
test asks whether the corporate opportunity  was one that was 
“so closely associated with the existing business activities” of 
the  corporation   [34].  The  “essential   to  the  business”   test 
inquires whether the opportunity was essential to the existence 
of the corporation [47]. Once it was preliminarily  determined 
that one of these tests was met, the next step was to determine 
if a director might have breached his fiduciary duty by 
appropriating  to himself  a corporate  opportunity  that should 
have belonged to his corporation. 
A fourth test of corporate opportunities – the “fairness” test – 
that later emerged  in a few jurisdictions  in the United States 
[48] [49]  [50], and  has  been  applied  by  Delaware  courts,
arguably reversed the process of inquiry by first looking at a
director’s  conduct,  particularly  whether  he exercised  fairness
in his dealings  with  his corporation.  Only  subsequently  was
the nature of the opportunity itself examined.7  We refer to this
as  the  “conduct-orientated”  approach  of  corporate
opportunities as opposed to the “nature-of-the-opportunity”
approach   of  the   three   previous   tests   which   centered   on
whether the opportunity was one which: 1) the corporation had
an interest or expectancy in (the “interest or expectancy” test),
2) was in the line of business of the corporation (the “line of
business”  test), or 3) was crucial or essential  to the business
(the “essential to the business” test).
The   key   question   of   the   fairness   test   or   the   “conduct- 
orientated” approach is whether the appropriation of an 
opportunity by a director satisfied “ethical standards of what is 
fair  and  equitable  (to  the  corporation  in)  particular  sets  of 
facts” [51] [52]. In Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., the Delaware 
Supreme  Court  emphasized  that  where  directors  find 
themselves in situations where they might have a conflict of 
interest,  “they are required  to demonstrate  their utmost good 
faith and the most scrupulous inherent fairness of the bargain” 
[53]. 
The court in Weinberger v. UOP, Inc. explained that “fair 
dealing” as an aspect of fairness “embraces questions of when 
the transaction was timed, how it was initiated, structured, 
negotiated,  disclosed  to the directors,  and how the approvals 
of  the  directors  and  the  stockholders  were  obtained”  [53]. 
Other factors considered in the test include whether fiduciaries 
placed  themselves  in  an  “adverse  and  hostile  position”  in 
relation to their corporation; whether fiduciaries came upon an 
7  See   section   8  below   on  “Australian   Law   on  Corporate 
Opportunities”. 
opportunity as a result of their corporate positions; whether the 
fiduciaries were authorized by the corporation to pursue the 
opportunity  on  its  behalf;  whether  the  fiduciaries  used  the 
assets  of  the  corporation  to  identify  or  develop  the 
opportunity;  and  whether  the fiduciaries  had  an intention  to 
resell the opportunity to the corporation [52[ [54]. 
Although, as stated, some jurisdictions have turned to the 
“fairness”   test,   it   has   not   gained   much   traction.   Talley 
observed that “courts employing this approach frequently 
encounter  line-drawing  problems  when  deciding  which 
projects  qualify  as  corporate  opportunities.   An  even  more 
vexing concern for courts employing a fairness test, however, 
is the challenge of articulating exactly what “fairness to the 
corporation” means [60]. Mitchell also opined, “Although 
fairness  defines  the  concept  of the  corporate  fiduciary,  it is 
itself one of the great unexplained mysteries of corporate law” 
[48]. As a result likely of the vexing issues relating to the 
“fairness” test, it is the “line of business” test that has a wide 
acceptance in most jurisdictions in the United States, including 
in Delaware [55] [56]. 
IX. AUSTRALIAN LAW ON CORPORATIONS
The Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), which became operative on 
1 July 2001, applies throughout Australia and sets out specific 
rules on related  party transactions  and director’s  duties [57]. 
The statute was part of attempts of successive Federal 
Governments  to  enact  a  national  company  law  in  order  to 
regulate  the  whole  field  of  company  activity  centrally  and 
address   an   absence   of  uniformity   on   the   subject   across 
Australia’s  states  [58].  But  previous  federal  statutes  on  the 
subject  had  been  attacked  in  Australia’s   High  Court,  the 
country’s highest court, and struck down as being 
unconstitutional [10] [11]. Much of the resistance to a national 
company  legislation  came  from  Australian  states  and 
territories  that  were  reluctant  to  yield  to  the  federal 
government  the  field  of  business  activity  since  it  was  an 
important source of revenue for them [10]. The Federal 
Parliament’s  competence  to  legislate  on  company  activities 
was constrained by the enabling provision of section 51(xx) of 
the  Australian  Commonwealth  Constitution  which  provides: 
“The Parliament shall, subject to this Constitution, have power 
to make laws for the peace, order, and good government of the 
Commonwealth  with respect to: ... (xx) foreign corporations, 
and trading or financial corporations  formed within the limits 
of the Commonwealth.” 
The Australian High Court’s initially narrow interpretation  of 
the  Federal  Parliament’s  legislative  power  effectively 
proscribed the Commonwealth  from passing a law in relation 
to the formation of companies. In the early case of Huddart
Parker & Co. Pty. Ltd v Moorehead  (1909)  8 CLR  330, the 
High Court of Australia ruled that the corporations powers in 
section 51 (xx) of the Australian Commonwealth  Constitution 
did not empower the Commonwealth to legislate on the 
operations  of corporations  – a field of activity the regulation 
of which the Constitution had reserved to the States. The High 
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Court had construed “formed” narrowly as referring to 
corporations that were already in existence and excluded 
companies that were yet to be formed. 
In 1989 the Corporations Act 1989 (Cth) was enacted by the 
Federal Parliament. But many States were against its 
implementation  and  questioned  its  constitutionality.  In  New
South Wales v. Commonwealth (1990) 169 CLR 482, the 
legislation  was  challenged  at  the  High  Court  on  the  main 
question of whether section 51(xx) of the Australian 
Commonwealth Constitution gave the Commonwealth 
Parliament  the  power  to  legislate  for  the  incorporation   of 
trading and financial corporations. The High Court again 
concluded that under section 51(xx) of the Constitution, the 
Commonwealth  Parliament  lacked  the power  to legislate  on 
the formation of companies. The Commonwealth Parliament’s 
power,  according  to  the  High  Court,  could  only  apply  to 
foreign corporations and corporations that had already been 
formed within the Commonwealth. 
The new Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) finally hurdled any 
constitutional challenge.    Without going further into the 
development of Australian company law that saw successive 
challenges to various national company legislation, which is 
beyond  the  scope  of  this  paper,8 the  Corporations  Act 2001
(Cth) was eventually passed by the Federal Parliament after 
Australia’s  various  state  parliaments  enacted  legislation  in 
2001 that referred to the Commonwealth the power to pass the 
Corporations Act [10] [11]. Under section 51 (xxxvii) of the 
Australian Commonwealth Constitution, the Commonwealth 
Parliament   has  the  power  to  make  laws  with  respect   to 
“matters referred to the Parliament  of the Commonwealth  by 
the Parliament or Parliaments of any State or States.” The 
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) is a complex piece of legislation 
that comprises 2,550 pages, nearly 1,500 sections, and 
incorporated schedules to the Act [58]. 
X. AUSTRALIAN LAW ON CORPORATE OPPORTUNITIES
There are two parts of the Corporations  Act 2001 (Cth) that 
touch on directors and corporate opportunities. The first one is 
on the general duties of directors, particularly sections 180 to 
182,   230,   and   260E,   and   the   other   is  on  related   party 
transactions,  particularly  sections  207, 228, and 229. Section 
180(1) provides for directors to use care and diligence in the 
exercise of their powers and discharge of their duties. Section 
180(2) encapsulates the business judgment rule and requires 
directors  to  make  business  judgments  in  good  faith  for  a 
proper purpose. Section 181 requires directors to exercise their 
powers and discharge their duties in good faith in the best 
interests of the corporation  and for a proper purpose. Section 
182 proscribes  directors from improperly  using their position 
to gain an advantage for themselves or someone else or cause 
detriment to the corporation.  Sections 230 and 260E state the 
8 For  an  account   of  the  history   of  Australian   corporation 
legislation, see “The History of the Regulation of Companies 
in Australia” in chapter 11 of Gooley, Russell, Dicker and 
Zammit at [10]. 
fiduciary character of directors’ duties. 
The  Corporations  Act 2001  (Cth)  provides  rules  on  related 
party transactions that are “designed to protect the interests of 
a public company’s members as a whole, by requiring member 
approval  for  giving  financial  benefits  to  related  parties  that 
could endanger those interests.”9  Section 229(2) provides that
giving a financial  benefit includes  giving a financial  benefit: 
(a) indirectly,  for  example,  through  1  or  more  interposed
entities; (b) by making an informal agreement, oral agreement
or an agreement  that has no binding force; and (c) that does
not  involve   paying  money  (for  example   by  conferring   a
financial advantage).
As is often the case, statutory provisions are too broad as to 
provide  precise  guidance  on certain  legal principles.  Such is 
the  case  with  the  Australian  doctrine  of  corporate 
opportunities,   whose   development   was   fashioned   by   the 
courts. While the doctrine in the United States, as previously 
noted, has also been developed by the courts, it is worth 
emphasizing that in contrast to Delaware courts that are 
pioneering  in  their  efforts  at  developing  the  law  on 
corporations,  Australian  courts  rely strongly  on stare decisis
and   jurisprudence   from   English   law   in   addressing   legal 
questions  involving  corporations  [10]  [11].  As  Vines 
observed,   “(f)or  a  long  time  it  was  fashionable   to  treat 
Australian law as a mere derivative of English law” [59]. 
Consequently  it was  almost  customary  to assume  that 
Australian law was just a transplant of English law [59]. This 
view was of course inaccurate  as Australian  law did diverge 
and  was  different  from  English  law  from  the  beginning,  as 
shown by legal historians [60] [61] [62]. Nonetheless the 
influence and impact of English law on Australian law is 
unmistakable   [63],   as   Australian   courts   have   recognized 
[64].10 Australian  law  still  shares  many  commonalities  with
English law as well as other nations of the Commonwealth  of 
Nations that observe the common law system [63]. Hence, an 
examination  of the Australian  law on corporate  opportunities 
will reveal the strong influence of English law. English law is 
arguably also a good starting point in examining the doctrine 
of corporate opportunities in Australia. 
Earlier, we cited the rise and application of the “fairness” test 
of corporate opportunities  in a few jurisdictions in the United 
States, including  in Delaware.  We argued that the “fairness” 
test was a reversal of the usual process of inquiry concerning 
corporate opportunities and could be recast as the “conduct- 
orientated” approach that first looked at whether a director 
exercised fairness in his dealings with his corporation.  Under 
this approach, only after examining a director’s behavior or 
conduct  was  the  nature  of  the  opportunity  itself  examined. 
This  conduct-orientated  approach  to corporate  opportunities, 
9  Section 207, Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). 
10 See, for instance, R v Wedge (1976) 1 NSWLR 581, Supreme 
Court  of  New  South  Wales,  25  June  1976,  where  Rath  J 
adopted Lord Watson’s statements  in Cooper v Stuart (1889) 
14 App Cas 286. 
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as opposed to the “nature-of-the-opportunity” approach, is 
arguably the approach of English law on the subject. 
English law mainly seeks to determine whether a director’s 
personal interests in taking an opportunity was in conflict with 
the  company’s   interests   [5].  This  is  the  same  as  asking 
whether  a director’s  conduct  in  taking  an  opportunity 
conflicted with his corporation’s interests [5]. The conduct- 
orientated approach was adopted by the Privy Council in 
Queensland  Mines  v.  Hudson  [65]  where  it  stated  that  a 
director is barred from exploiting  an opportunity  except with 
the approval of the board [66]. 
Another approach adopted by the English courts is to impose 
the “no-profits”  rule [5]. Adopted  by the House  of Lords in 
Regal (Hastings) v. Gulliver [66], the rule states that a director 
is not permitted from profiting from a corporate opportunity 
except  by  making  a  full  disclosure  and  securing  his 
corporation’s approval or consent before taking up an 
opportunity. Good faith or honesty on the part of a director in 
pursuing the opportunity,  or that the company benefited from 
the director’s  pursuit of the opportunity  or that the company 
itself was not in a position to pursue the opportunity, were not 
relevant absent the director’s making a full disclosure and 
securing  his corporation’s  approval  or consent  before  taking 
up an opportunity.11
Whether the no-conflict rule or no-profit rule is followed, the 
basic premise is that a director owes fiduciary  obligations  to 
his corporation.  This fiduciary obligation  was emphasized  by 
in the Australian High Court by Gaudron and McHugh JJ in 
Breen  v.  Williams  [67]  where  their  Honours  said:  “In  this 
country, fiduciary obligations arise because a person has come 
under an obligation  to act in another’s  interests.  As a result, 
equity imposes on the fiduciary proscriptive obligations – not 
to obtain  any unauthorised  benefit  from the relationship  and 
not to be in a position of conflict.” 
In  Re HIH  Insurance  Ltd (in prv liq);  Australian  Securities
and Investments  Commission  v. Adler [68],  Santow  J in  the 
New South Wales Supreme Court elaborated: 
(1) A director (as a fiduciary) is under an obligation
not to promote his persona interest by making or
pursuing a gain in circumstances  where there is
a conflict or a real or substantial possibility of a
conflict between his personal interests and those
of the company [69]. This is both at general law
and by statute  (s 181 and as applicable  ss 182
and 183). Such promotion would not be to act in
good  faith  in  the  best  interests  of  the
corporation,  or for proper  purposes  9s 181).  If
the director has improperly  used his position or
11 Since  the  “no-profit”   rule  also  focuses   on  the  director’s 
conduct – and not on the nature of the opportunity – in having 
to   make   a   full   disclosure   and   secure   his   corporation’s 
approval or consent before taking up an opportunity,  the rule 
can also be described as a “conduct-orientated” approach. 
information  to gain such advantage  ss 182 and 
183 respectively are breached. 
(2) In order to assess whether or not there is a real
sensible  possibility  of  conflict  one  must  adopt
the position of the reasonable person looking at
the relevant facts and circumstances of the
particular case [70] [71].
(3) Nonetheless, a director may act with a person
interest even though the director has not free his
or her mind of that personal interest when acting
provided that this personal interest was not the
actuating motive rather than some bona fide
concern  for  the  benefit  of  the  company  as  a
whole or for fairness as between members [72].
(4) In certain circumstances, such as a director in “a
position of power and influence” over the board,
mere  disclosure  of  a  conflict  between  interest
and  duty  and  abstaining  from  voting  is
insufficient to satisfy a director’s fiduciary duty.
The director may also be under a positive duty
to take  steps  to protect  the  company’s  interest
such as by using such power and influence as he
had to prevent the transaction going ahead [73].
(5) What  action,   beyond   disclosure,   the  director
must take will depend on matters such as the
degree to which the director has been involved
in the transaction, and the gravity of possible
outcomes for the company [74].
(6) A  director  of  a  company  …  who  is  also  a
director  of  another  company…  must  not
exercise his or her powers for the benefit or the
gain of the second company without clearly
disclosing the second company’s interests to the
first company and obtaining the first company’s
consent: [75].
XI. CONCLUSION
This  paper  sought  to  contribute  to  the  current  debate  on 
corporate opportunities by comparing the Australian and 
Delaware approaches to corporate opportunities. Delaware’s 
preeminence in corporate law makes it an ideal benchmark for 
a comparison with Australian corporate opportunities law. The 
paper  reported  on  four  tests  to  corporate  opportunities  that 
were adopted by various jurisdictions of the United States: (1) 
the  “interest  or  expectancy”  test;  (2)  the  “line  of  business” 
test;  (3)  the  “essential  to  the  business”  test;  and  (4)  the 
“fairness” test. 
The “line of business” test was developed by the Delaware 
Supreme Court in 1939 in Guth v. Loft Inc. [18] and reflected 
a broadening  of the notion of corporation  opportunities  from 
the  “interest  or  expectancy”   test  articulated   previously   in 
Lagarde  v. Anniston  Lime & Stone  Co.  [34] and  Farwell  v.
Pyle-National Electric Headlight Co. [41]. Together with the 
“essential  to the business”  test that emerged  as a doctrine  in 
News-Journal  Corporation v. Gore [46] and Blaustein v. Pan
American  Petroleum  & Transport  Co.  [47],  we  collectively 
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A fourth test of corporate opportunities – the “fairness” test – 
that later emerged in a few jurisdictions in the United States, 
including  Delaware,  appeared  to depart  from  the “nature-of- 
the-opportunity”  approach by focusing on a director’s conduct 
in pursuing a corporate opportunity. We claimed a reversal of 
approaches because under the “fairness” test, the process of 
inquiry began by first looking at whether a director exercised 
fairness  in  his  dealings  with  his  corporation  and  only  later 
sought to examine the nature of the opportunity itself. This 
approach we referred to as the “conduct-orientated”  approach 
of corporate opportunities. 
The recasting of the diverse doctrinal approaches as either the 
“nature-of-the-opportunity” approach or the “conduct- 
orientated” approach appears sound in light of the approach to 
corporate  opportunities  in  English  and  Australian  law. 
Although English law, which has had a strong influence and 
impact on Australian law, has the no-conflict and the no-profit 
rules on corporate opportunities, both these rules, we argued, 
could actually be reframed as being conduct-orientated 
approaches. Under both rules, the relevant starting point of 
inquiry was a director’s conduct in taking an opportunity. 
However,  whereas  the  conduct-orientated  approach  is 
entrenched  in  English  and  Australian  jurisprudence  (and  in 
statute  in Australia  under  the Corporations  Act 2001  [Cth]), 
the  approach  has  been  found  shaky  by  American 
commentators.   These   commentators   have   also   commonly 
shown the wide acceptance of the “line of business” test, 
especially in Delaware. This divergence is apt for further 
examination in another paper, especially one that looks at 
differences in historical contexts and regulatory regimes of the 
two jurisdictions. 
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